Numerous studies have attempted to find a clear link between pay practices and performance, but have largely failed. In Good to Great, Jim Collins said his team 'found no systematic pattern linking executive compensation to the process of going from good to great.'

許多研究都試圖找到薪酬措施與績效之間的明確聯(lián)系，但多數(shù)都以失敗告終。在《從優(yōu)秀到卓越》（Good to Great）中，吉姆?科林斯（Jim Collins）稱，他的研究小組“發(fā)現(xiàn)管理層薪酬與企業(yè)從優(yōu)秀走向卓越的過程沒有系統(tǒng)性聯(lián)系?！?/div>

There was no indication, for instance, that bonuses or stock options were more widely used by the good-to-great companies. Moreover, Collins found that the executives who lead the good-to-great transition actually received slightly less total cash compensation than their counterparts at comparison companies.

例如，沒有證據(jù)表明從優(yōu)秀走向卓越的企業(yè)對獎金或股票期權(quán)的應(yīng)用更廣泛。而且，科林斯還發(fā)現(xiàn)，領(lǐng)導(dǎo)企業(yè)從優(yōu)秀走向卓越的管理人員實際得到的現(xiàn)金薪酬總額略低于對照企業(yè)中職位相當(dāng)?shù)娜恕?/div>

Pfeffer and Sutton come to a similar conclusion about most efforts to boost performance by creating pay incentives:

普費弗（Pfeffer）和薩頓（Sutton）分析了試圖通過提供薪酬激勵提高績效的多數(shù)措施，并得出一個類似的結(jié)論：

' There is, in fact, little evidence that equity incentives of any kind, including stock options, enhance organizational performance. One review of more than 220 studies concluded that equity ownership had no consistent effect on financial performance. Another massive study and review of research on executive compensation published by the National Bureau of Economic Research reported that most schemes designed to align managerial and shareholder interests failed to do so.'

“實際上，幾乎沒有證據(jù)表明任何種類的股權(quán)激勵──包括股票期權(quán)──能夠提高組織績效。一篇對220多項研究的文獻綜述得出結(jié)論，股權(quán)對財務(wù)績效沒有一致性影響?！绷硪黄擅绹鴩医?jīng)濟研究局（National Bureau of Economic Research）發(fā)表的關(guān)于管理層薪酬研究的大型研究與文獻綜述稱，多數(shù)旨在協(xié)調(diào)管理層利益與股東利益的薪酬方案都失敗了?！?/div>

It's not that people don't respond to financial incentives. They clearly do. When you pay salespeople commissions based on their sales, for instance, they will always sell more than when you simply pay them a flat salary. The same goes for an individual crafts person who gets paid on a per piece basis.

這并不是說人們對財務(wù)激勵無動于衷。他們顯然會對財務(wù)激勵做出反應(yīng)。例如，當(dāng)你根據(jù)銷售人員的銷售額向他們支付提成時，他們的銷售額總是比你只付給他們固 定工資時多。同樣的道理也適用于按件計酬的單個手工業(yè)者。

The Journal's Jon Auerbach captured the kind of supercharged environment that pay incentives can create in a profile of a salesman for EMC Corp. named John Chatwin in 1998. At the time, the company paid salespeople about 65% of their total pay in commissions, and put no cap on the commissions they could earn.

《華爾街日報》記者奧爾巴克（Jon Auerbach）在一篇報道中通過1998年易安信公司（EMC Corp）中一位叫查特溫（John Chatwin）的推銷員的經(jīng)歷，揭示了薪酬激勵可能帶來的激勵環(huán)境。當(dāng)時，易安信公司對銷售人員支付的薪酬總額中，約65%是提成，而且對銷售人員能拿 到的提成不設(shè)上限。

The story begins with Chatwin, an ex college hockey player, fearing he won't make his sales target for the quarter. To ensure that doesn't happen, he shifts into overdrive, calling clients while ferrying relatives to his son's christening, and breaking away from a family barbecue to contact a customer about a deal. 'I may not be brilliant,' Chatwin told Auerbach, 'but I'm hungry, I'm scrappy.'

這個故事就從曾是大學(xué)曲棍球隊隊員的查特溫說起，他總擔(dān)心自己達不到當(dāng)季的銷售目標(biāo)。為了確保不發(fā)生這種情況，他開始拼命工作，在接親戚參加他兒子的受洗 儀式時還在給客戶打電話，還在一次家庭烤肉聚餐時中途離開去和客戶談生意?！拔铱赡懿⒉宦斆鳌保樘販馗嬖V奧爾巴克，“但是我心懷渴望，我斗志旺盛?！?/div>

The problem, however, is that most jobs today aren't like Chatwin's, where performance depends largely on individual effort and can be easily measured. Today's jobs generally involve team work. Success is less due to an individual's effort, and measurement of individual effort becomes more complex, if not impossible. In these situations, pay for performance can often seem unfair and arbitrary, and the result can demotivate, rather than motivate, employees. Resentment can fester, and significant time and energy can be wasted by people trying to get personal credit rather than working for team success.

但問題是，如今的多數(shù)工作都和查特溫的工作不同，他的工作業(yè)績主要取決于個人努力，衡量起來也很容易。而如今的工作通常需要團隊合作。成功對個人努力的依 賴降低了，而衡量個人努力即使有可能，也變得更加復(fù)雜。在這種情況下，根據(jù)業(yè)績支付薪酬經(jīng)常顯得不公平而隨意，結(jié)果反而會打消員工的積極性，而不是激勵他 們。負面情緒可能會惡化，員工會追求個人業(yè)績而不是團隊成功，從而浪費大把時間和精力。

The bottom line is this: Incentive pay is an effective tool in situations where performance can be fairly measured and where it is based largely on individual effort. But it is less effective in situations - common in today's workplace - where the measurements are highly subjective and the work is done by teams.

歸根結(jié)底，當(dāng)業(yè)績可以公平衡量且主要取決于個人努力時，激勵性薪酬是一項有效的工具。但是當(dāng)業(yè)績衡量的主觀性很高，且工作是由團隊完成時（這正是當(dāng)今工作環(huán)境中的普遍情況）激勵性薪酬的有效性將會降低。

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