Every era of history is defined by its signature challenge. For the first half of the 20th century, it was what to do about German and Japanese militarism; for the second half, it was the struggle against the Soviet Union.
每個(gè)時(shí)代都是由其標(biāo)志性的挑戰(zhàn)界定的。20世紀(jì)上半葉，這種挑戰(zhàn)是如何應(yīng)對(duì)德國(guó)和日本的軍國(guó)主義；下半葉則是對(duì)付前蘇聯(lián)。
　　
But today and for the foreseeable future, the principal threat to world order is not from some aggressive great power. Instead, we must contend with a host of global phenomena: the spread of nuclear materials and weapons, terrorism, pandemic disease, climate change and economic protectionism.
但在當(dāng)前及可預(yù)見的未來(lái)，世界秩序面臨的主要威脅并非來(lái)自某個(gè)侵略性大國(guó)。相反，我們必須對(duì)付眾多全球性現(xiàn)象：核材料與核武器的擴(kuò)散，恐怖主義，大范圍流行病，氣候變化以及經(jīng)濟(jì)保護(hù)主義。
　　
No country, not even the US, can face these challenges alone. The world is simply too large and too complex to control. By their nature, these challenges are best met by collective effort. Decisions to opt out of global arrangements (or an inability to opt in, as we see in the case of governments too weak to combat terrorists who set up shop on their territory) can have repercussions far beyond a country's borders.
沒有一個(gè)國(guó)家能單獨(dú)面對(duì)這些挑戰(zhàn)，即使是美國(guó)也不行。這個(gè)世界實(shí)在太大、太復(fù)雜，令人無(wú)法掌控。這些挑戰(zhàn)的性質(zhì)決定了，應(yīng)對(duì)它們的最佳方式是集體努力。一國(guó)決定不參與全球安排（或無(wú)力參與其中，比如有些政府太過軟弱，無(wú)力抗擊在其領(lǐng)土上建立地盤的恐怖分子），其影響的波及面可能遠(yuǎn)遠(yuǎn)超出該國(guó)國(guó)界。
　　
But to acknowledge that we are all multilateralists now (or at least need to be) is only to start the conversation. Multilateralism is not one thing but many. The issue takes on a new urgency in the aftermath of the recent Copenhagen conference, which brought together representatives of 193 governments in an unsuccessful effort to reach a formal, binding and comprehensive accord. Whatever its consequences for climate change, Copenhagen is but the most recent reminder that classic multilateralism is increasingly difficult to achieve.
不過，承認(rèn)我們現(xiàn)在都是（或者至少有必要成為）多邊主義者，只是對(duì)話的開始。多邊主義不是一件而是許多事情。不久前舉行的哥本哈根會(huì)議結(jié)束后，這一問題呈現(xiàn)出新的緊迫性。會(huì)議召集了193個(gè)政府的代表，試圖達(dá)成一項(xiàng)有約束力的廣泛正式協(xié)議，但終告失敗。無(wú)論哥本哈根對(duì)氣候變化的影響如何，它都只不過是最新的一記提醒：經(jīng)典的多邊主義已越來(lái)越難以實(shí)現(xiàn)。
　　
This same reality also helps to account for the world's inability to agree to a new global trade accord. Launched in Qatar nearly a decade ago, the Doha round of negotiations has stalled. There are simply too many participants, too many contentious issues and too many domestic political concerns to discuss.
同樣的現(xiàn)實(shí)也有助于解釋，各國(guó)為何無(wú)法就新的全球貿(mào)易協(xié)定達(dá)成共識(shí)。近10年前在卡塔爾啟動(dòng)的多哈回合談判已經(jīng)擱置。談判參與方、有爭(zhēng)議的問題和有待討論的國(guó)內(nèi)政治關(guān)切實(shí)在是太多了。
　　
This problem also explains the near-total irrelevance of the United Nations General Assembly. "One man, one vote" may provide a sound basis for domestic politics, but on a global scale democracy (or, more precisely, democratic multilateralism) is a prescription for doing nothing. It is not simply the large number of participants but the fact that it makes little sense to give countries with minuscule populations and economies equal standing with, say, China or the US.
這一問題也可以解釋，聯(lián)合國(guó)大會(huì)為什么會(huì)近乎被邊緣化?！耙蝗艘黄薄被蛟S可以為一國(guó)內(nèi)政打下良好基礎(chǔ)，但從全球范圍看，民主（或者更確切地說(shuō)是民主多邊主義）才是無(wú)作為的處方。問題不僅在于要有大量的參與方，還在于這樣一個(gè)事實(shí)：賦予人口小國(guó)與中國(guó)或美國(guó)等經(jīng)濟(jì)體同等重要的地位，是不合理的。