The UN's founders predicted as much when they created the Security Council. The idea was to establish an elite body to tackle the world's most important issues. The problem is that the composition of the Security Council reflects what the world looked like after the second world war. That world is now more than 60 years old. Missing from the ranks of permanent members are India, Japan, Germany, Brazil and representatives of a more integrated Europe.
聯(lián)合國(guó)的創(chuàng)始人在設(shè)立安理會(huì)時(shí)就預(yù)見了這些問題。他們的想法是通過成立一個(gè)精英團(tuán)體來(lái)解決世界上最重要的問題。問題在于，安理會(huì)的組成反映的是二戰(zhàn)后的世界面貌，距今已有60年。常任理事國(guó)的隊(duì)伍中，漏掉了印度、日本、德國(guó)、巴西以及一個(gè)更加一體化的歐洲的代表。
　　
It was this weakness (along with the inability to agree on the make-up of a reformed Security Council) that in part led to the creation of the Group of Seven and the trilateral process in the 1970s. Japan and the European Commission gained a seat at this important table. Yet over the decades, the G7 also proved inadequate, as it left out such critical countries as China and India. Hence the emergence of the Group of 20 in the midst of the global financial crisis and the Major Economies Forum as concerns over climate change mounted.
正是這一缺陷（以及無(wú)法就改革后安理會(huì)的組成達(dá)成共識(shí)）在一定程度上促成了上世紀(jì)70年代七國(guó)集團(tuán)(G7)及三邊進(jìn)程的創(chuàng)立。日本和歐洲委員會(huì)在這個(gè)重要組織中獲得了一席之地。但幾十年來(lái)的事實(shí)證明，七國(guó)集團(tuán)也不足以解決問題，因?yàn)樗┑袅讼裰袊?guó)和印度這樣的關(guān)鍵國(guó)家。于是，20國(guó)集團(tuán)(G20)在全球金融危機(jī)期間興起，主要經(jīng)濟(jì)體論壇也隨著人們對(duì)氣候變化擔(dān)憂加劇而浮出水面。
　　
It is too soon to judge the impact of these latest versions of elite multilateralism. In the meantime, we are seeing the emergence of multiple innovations. One is regionalism. The proliferation of bilateral and regional trade pacts (most recently in Asia) is in part a reaction to the failure to conclude a global trade accord. Such arrangements are inferior - they do not, for example, normally deal with subsidies, much less cover all products and services. They can also have the perverse effect of retarding trade by discriminating against non-members. But some trade expansion is preferable to none.
要判斷這些精英多邊主義最新版本的影響，現(xiàn)在還為時(shí)尚早。與此同時(shí)，我們看到多種多樣的創(chuàng)新正在形成。其中之一是地區(qū)主義。雙邊及地區(qū)貿(mào)易協(xié)議的大量涌現(xiàn)（最近在亞洲），在一定程度上是對(duì)全球貿(mào)易協(xié)議無(wú)法達(dá)成做出的回應(yīng)。此類安排并非最佳辦法，比如它們通常不涉及補(bǔ)貼問題，更不會(huì)涵蓋所有的產(chǎn)品與服務(wù)。它們還可能由于歧視非成員國(guó)而產(chǎn)生阻礙貿(mào)易的不利影響，但某種程度的貿(mào)易擴(kuò)張總好過原地踏步。
　　
A second alternative is functional multilateralism - coalitions of the willing and relevant. A global accord on climate will prove elusive for some time to come. But that need not translate into international inaction. A useful step would be to conclude a global pact to discourage the cutting down and burning of forests, something that accounts for a fifth of the world's carbon output. Copenhagen made some limited progress here, but more needs to be done to assist such countries as Brazil and Indonesia.
第二種可選方案是功能性多邊主義——由有意愿的相關(guān)方結(jié)成同盟。未來(lái)一段時(shí)間，達(dá)成全球性的氣候協(xié)議將會(huì)相當(dāng)困難，但這并不意味著國(guó)際社會(huì)只能不作為。一項(xiàng)有益的舉措將是，達(dá)成一項(xiàng)全球協(xié)定，阻止砍伐和焚燒森林——它所產(chǎn)生的碳排放占全球總量的五分之一。在這方面，哥本哈根取得了有限進(jìn)展，但有必要采取更多行動(dòng)，幫助像巴西和印尼這樣的國(guó)家。
　　
Yet another alternative might be described as informal multilateralism. In many cases it will prove impossible to negotiate international accords that will be approved by national parliaments. Instead, governments would sign up to implementing, as best they can, a series of measures consistent with agreed-upon international norms. We are most likely to see this in the financial realm, where setting standards for the capital requirements of banks, accounting systems and credit ratings would facilitate global economic growth.
還有一種可選方案或許可以表述為非正式多邊主義。在很多情況下，不可能通過談判達(dá)成將獲得各國(guó)國(guó)會(huì)批準(zhǔn)的國(guó)際協(xié)議。各國(guó)政府倒是可以簽署一項(xiàng)這樣的協(xié)議：承諾盡其所能實(shí)施一系列與一致認(rèn)可的國(guó)際準(zhǔn)則相符的措施。我們最有可能在金融領(lǐng)域看到這種做法，制定銀行資本金要求、會(huì)計(jì)制度和信用評(píng)級(jí)方面的標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，將促進(jìn)全球經(jīng)濟(jì)復(fù)蘇。
　　
None of this - not elitism or regionalism or functionalism or informalism - is a panacea. Such collective action is invariably less inclusive, less comprehensive and less predictable than formal global accords. It can suffer from a lack of legitimacy. But it is doable and desirable, and can lead to or complement classic multilateralism. Multilateralism in the 21st century is, like the century itself, likely to be more fluid and, at times, messy than what we are used to.
以上沒有哪一種——無(wú)論是精英主義、地區(qū)主義，還是功能主義或非正式主義——是萬(wàn)靈藥。在參與度、綜合性和可預(yù)見性方面，此類集體行動(dòng)總是不如正式的全球協(xié)定，并可能因?yàn)槿狈戏ㄐ远e步維艱。但它行得通，也值得做，它可以促成經(jīng)典多邊主義，或?qū)ζ湫纬裳a(bǔ)充。21世紀(jì)的多邊主義與這個(gè)世紀(jì)本身一樣，可能會(huì)比我們所習(xí)慣的情形更加多變甚至有時(shí)會(huì)更加混亂。
　　
The writer is president of the Council on Foreign Relations and author of War of Necessity, War of Choice: A Memoir of Two Iraq Wars.
作者是美國(guó)對(duì)外關(guān)系委員會(huì)主席，著有《必要的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)，選擇的戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)：兩場(chǎng)伊拉克戰(zhàn)爭(zhēng)紀(jì)事》